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FOR the last twenty or thirty years we have been gradually
drifting towards some form of determinism in human conduct.
I say some form of dctcrniunsm because there is a wide difference,
yes. a gulf between in'uid dctcriiiinisiii such as held b\' Adler and
others that all human thinking and behavior is fundamental]}' pur-
posive and directed by some underlying force to a goal, and that
chance mechanistic and atomistic determinism into which many
modern thinkers are drifting. We have, it is true, been forced
to recognize that every variation in structure and chemical com-
position of the body modifies our thoughts and feelings. How-
ever, no one has as yet pointed out the exact causes of all these
minute changes. We also see the curve of mental life rise and de-
cline with the growth, development, and decay of the body. We
also note that certain brain processes seem to be the condition of
consciousness.
Heredity gives us certain dominant instinctive tendencies which
map out the chief line of human action, feeling, and thinking. Such
conduct is soon converted into habits most of which operate without
the interference of consciousness. These habits drift most of us
to our eternal destiny. Again, many forms of human behavior
seem to be under the guidance of some unconscious mental force.
Either line of facts naturally leads to the question as to how
far the individual and society can consciously direct their destiny.
Out of these perplexing problems the bastard child Behaviorism
has been born, and now seems to be dominated by the idea that
nothing but mechanism shall remain in the universe.
Why do I say "dominated by the idea?" According to the be-
havioristic doctrine neither purpose nor consciousness is ever a
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cause. It is only an accompan\ing phenomenon. I should have
said that certain neurones in the brains of these behaviorists were
set in motion by the adequate stimulus and formed a yieural pattern.
i')Ut how did this original adequate sf'nuiilus happen to set up a
motion in the neurones of these behaviorists that has been going
on for }ears? And how have these neurones compelled them to a
definite line of activity all this time? What is the state of these
neurones and synoptic connections that forced them to perform
delicate experiments? If any behaviorist will explain his own
behaz'ior in writing a book, in hunting persistentl\- for things to
support his doctrine, in trying to explain wit and humor as having
their origin in the sensitive zones of the body—I say if he will
explain his own conduct in these things without any reference to
purpose and show that he really believes what he says about his own
behavior—we might understand him. We have had no such ])er-
sonal a])plication of the doctrine. This same consciousness which
he would ignore tells him that his eoiiseiaus purpose is a force in
writing his book. If he does succeed in transferring all these in-
tellectual forces to the neurones, he will simply endow them with
the mysticism which he wishes to escape.
A short time ago, in talking with a defender of behaviorism
who at least prides himself on his ability to direct his own thoughts,
1 said, ''Wait a minute. Come scjuarely to the question. Do >ou
mean to sa\' that }our present thoughts have absolutely nothing to
do with the thoughts that shall follow?" Of course he hesitated
and would not give an answer to the (juestion.
Thus we have the heart of the behavioristic difficulty and the
one that directs most of the disguised arguments in the treatment
of instinct, of inherited traits, of talents or capacities, of imita-
tion, of suggestion, of emotions as glandular and visceral action,
of wit and humor as originating from the sensitive zones of the
body.
Behaviorism has forced ps\chology to become more accurate
and scientific. Secondly, it has demonstrated a much larger field of
mechanistic behavior than psychology once recognized or admitted.
Thirdly, it has forced a desirable modification of our ideas of in-
stinct. Fourthly, it has extended, to great advantage, the place
of habit and of the "conditioned reflex" in the formation of habit.
Finally, beha\iorism has helped to clarify the learning process.
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With such an array of achievement, what could be said against th-^
behavioristic doctrine? It is the same fault which Aristotle said
we ever \ where find in adolescents
—
the fault of carrying ei'erytliiiii/
to c.vtrciiics. Let us examine these views as represented by the
extremes I have already mentioned.
I. Instinct must go, zve have no use for the word, says the
behavioristic theor\-. Some years ago when the behaviorists made
gogues became frightened and said if we continue to use the word
instinct we shall be classified with the mystics. Those who did
these bold statements several psychologists and especially peda-
not even surmise the pure materialism into which they were being
led looked for some compromise term. So we find toda\' such
terms as human urges, drives, organized impulses, original nature,
prepotent tendencies, dominant tendencies, and innate dominate ad-
iustments. Will anyone be deluded into thinking he has avoided
mysticism by the use of any of these terms? Or will he abolish
anv implication of purpose which is the chief concern of the be-
havioristic doctrine? Several of these educational writers set forth
what they think is the behavioristic doctrine and proclaim their
change of heart, and avow their purpose to use some of these terms
instead of instinct. So we have two well known authors sa\ing.
"We follow strictly the line of argument used by the extreme ph\si-
ological psvchologists." Yet the whole book is built on the as-
sumption that mind is a real cause of conduct. \\'e are told that
we "must recognize the child's interest," that ''social impulses
motivate adaptation." Dominant drives are often mentioned. We
have a section on "our organism seeking its own end." In general,
behaviorism avoids the use of such terms as above mentioned and
uses instead neural patterns, stinndus—response—mechanisms, chain
reflexes, neuro-muscular units. All of this brings to mind forcibly
what Schwarz says about the semi- or pseudo-original man. "The
appearance of originality is more to him than the reality of it."
Many words become popular not because of their meaning or use-
fulness, but because of their noble origin.
I have just finished an examination of 150 books on psychology,
all written in the last fifteen years. Fully eighty percent of them
remain unmodified by the behavioristic movement so far as the
use of the word instinct is concerned. It should be added that the
behaviorists have compelled all psychologists to a more careful
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use of the term iiist'nicl, and Iia\e shown tis the excessi\-e tendenc)-
to expand instinct into the field of liabit. Hut AJori^^an as early as
1898 inaugurated this scientihc inc|uiry as to the relation between
habit and instinct in liis book Habit cnid Iiisliiwt.
One beha\ioiistic book tries to make an ingenious substitution
for all instincts: six prepotent tendencies. Is not this all we have
ever meant by instinct—a tendencx to fight, to get angry, to mani-
fest fear, love, and jealous}? Xo. he would save his beha\ioristic
ideas h\ putting this prepotency in the nervous mechanism and
reducing them to six physical manifestations. These are start in;/
and i^'ithdraiciju/. rejectinf/, strnc/i/liiifj, luinc/er reaction { not hun-
ger), sensitiz'c cone reactio)is, and sex reactio)is. These constitute
the phvsical mechanism out of which all other actixities develoj).
So our author talks of prei)otent needs, prepotent urges, and pre-
potent habits. However, he has found that these did not supi)ly
liis need, so he uses over thirty terms implying the essential idea
as found in the most careful writers on instinct.
Here is the question we wish to put to any writer following
these lines: If everything in this universe should be wiped out and
nothing left but the physical conditions as we have known them
since historic times, and the human race should start its develop-
ment anew with just these six prepotent tendencies, would such
a race not in the run of ages develop habits, customs and institu-
tions similar to ours? T say similar, and that is all any believer
in instincts expects. \\'ould not men develop warring and strife,
marriage and family life of some kind, crime and religion, poverty
and wealth, jealousy and love? Have we not this proof in the his-
tory of mankind? The explanation that this generation was taught
these things by the previous generation is only a delusion and a
make-believe explanation. Where did the first generations get these
things? Where did these patterns come from if acquired character-
istics and habits are not transmissible?
If I were a strict behaviorist I would turn heaven and earth to
prove that acquired characteristics are inherited. Then I couVI
have some kind of argument as a substitute for pur|)osive, d\namic
action.
Professor Watson says there are thousands of variations laid
down in the germ plasm. Here to deny both the inheritance of ac-
quired characteristics and all kinds of purposive behavior takes us
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clear back to Democratus with electrons and protons falling together
b\' haphazard chance through an eternity of time until the_\ hap-
pened to fall together and so produce what only appears to be pur-
posive action. According to their doctrine even Professor \\ atson
and his followers are not guided by any desire or purpose to make
the world better or to teach us anything. By some chance variation
in the protons and electrons, the brain processes have just chanced
to develop in them this line of behavior.
Smith and Guthrie in their General Psychology say that "con-
viction and belief may be described as the attachment of response
tendencies to verbal statements." Moral conviction consists in say-
ing the thing is wrong. "A volitional act," they say, "is the out-
come of a delayed reaction." If you should appeal to me for one
hundred dollars to save a group of flood-stricken refugees from
starving, and if I should think it over for an hour or even all night,
and then say, "Yes, I will give it," such would be a delayed neural
action. I might think that my thinking had something to do with
the final outcome, but it did not. As soon as the brain reaction was
completed the answer was inevitable. If you ask what delays the
brain reaction a day, a month, or year, the only answer is other
brain reactions.
II. There is no such thing as inherited traits, talents, or tem-
peraments says the leader of this school. In all of these cases Pro-
fessor \\ atson and others are careful to take the cases of moderate
differences : hypothetical cases such as two boys, where one is the
favorite of the mother and the other of the father. The one be-
comes a painter and the other a warrior. But why do they not ac-
count for our idiots and imbeciles, for Socrates, Mozart, Napoleon,
Gauss, Leonardo, and Lincoln? If you want to see a psychological
law, take your outstanding cases first. If any one admits that there
are born into this world idiots and imbeciles, will he assume that
there is a definite limit where imbecility ceases and from that point
all individuals are alike? For example, if we admit any variation
in natural mathematical ability at all, does it not stand to reason that
there are all degrees of variation, even though we cannot detect
it in all cases? If there are no degrees of inheritance, then the
whole fabric of intelligence tests is a delusion and a snare.
Suppose the germ plasm should from some unknown cause vary
so as to produce some physical modification in the endocrine glands,
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and this in turn should be accompanied by some unusual neural
acti\it\- which resu!tetl in a prepotent tendency to music or to murder.
\\h\- not sa\- tlie indi\idual inherited a tendenc\- for music or for
murder? There is only one reason—this might imply that something
intellectual or emotional was inherited—some purposive behavior.
Professor Watson rests his claim that there are no intellectual
and emotional race dififerences largely on the assumption that pride
of race has kept us from admitting that there are no differences.
But how did this pride of race get started? Is there nothing in
original nature that inevitably leads to pride of race? When he as-
serts that right-handedness is due to social usage, can he offer the
slightest suggestion why it is so universal ? Did it accidentally start
with Adam and Eve and has it been scattered all over the world by
social custom? It is easy to explain existing things by social cus-
tom as long as one does not attempt to explain the origin and de-
velopment of social custom.
I thoroughly agree that many of the individual differences and
a large percent of what is generall}' attributed to inheritance of
traits and talents are due to earl\- happenings in life. This is true
whether }ou look at the facts from the point of view of the Freud-
ians or the r>ehaviorists. I will even go beyond this and emphasize
the place of chance happenings in life and their power to determine
destin}-. Ikit. as already stated, the chief sin of behaviorism is to
carry everything to extremes. Their fear lest they leave any indi-
cation of mind as a cause of pvu'posive behavior sometimes drives
them headlong into pure nonsense, such as the admission of in-
stincts in animals but the denial of them in man. the development
of all human behavior out of "scjuirmings." the denial of degrees
of intellectual ability and thereby the discrediting of all intelligence
tests, the futile effort to trace wit and humor to the sensitive zones
of the body.
III. For obvious reasons, imitation has been one of the main
lines of attack. Xo one denies that many of the earlv social psv-
chologists and popular lecturers on human conduct unduh' expanded
and exaggerated the place of imitation. But the behaviorist sees
in any kind of imitation the implication of purposive action. So
they have worked hard and long with animals to show that they
do not imitate. But why carry these results over to human con-
duct when Professor W'atson savs that because animals have in-
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stincts in no wise proves that man has them also. If a positive
result cannot be carried over with some basis of scientific inference,
K'hv carry over a negative one?
Professor Allport finds it very necessary to dispose of imitation
in connection with the development of speech. He says, "The child
does not imitate or duplicate the speech of his elders. There is
evoked simply the nearest similar ear-vocal reflex, which, with his
present limitation of pronouncing, he has been able to fixate.*'
.\gain, the whole attempt is to rule out any implication of purposive
behavior. He says, "Imitation would simply be voluntarily copy-
ing them." He seems unable to conceive of purposive behavior
that is not voluntarily conscious.
As over and against this, Koehler states in his Mentality of Apes
that "even animal psychologists have not always paid sufficient at-
tention to this fundamental difiference between "simple" human
imitation and the imitation we so lightly expect from animals, and
so people were to a certain extent astonished when it was first shown
experimentally that animals do not as easily imitate as expected.
Less astonishment would perhaps have been felt if it had been
realized that, after all, man has finst to understand in some degree
before it even occurs to him to imitate." He finally shows that the
chimpanzee does exhibit four kinds of imitation and that there is
no mere imitation without a trace of insight.
I\\ Suggestion is so closely related to imitation as to arouse
the same fears. For this reason you do not find the behavioris'^
dealing with the striking difficulties that are presented in psychiatry
and abnormal psychology in general. Suggestion is reduced to the
power of the spoken word over the bodily mechanism. The strictly
obiective method precludes any consideration of dreams, delusions,
subjective pains and symptoms.
V. "Emotion," we are told by Professor Watson, "is an heredi-
tarv pattern reaction, involving profound changes of the bodil\'
mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular
systems. In Psychologies of 192^ the same writer tells us that
there are only three original pattern reactions which corres])ond
to what we call fear, rage, and love. All others are developed out
of conditioned responses. Professor Allport, following this line
of conditioned responses, stretches it to the limit in explaining away
sympathy. We all believe in conditioned responses^ and thousands
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of activities that once had no satisfactor\- ex])lanation beloni^- to this
group. This is especially true in the tield of sex peculiarities and
abnormalities. But here is the point I want to emphasize. Ccncr-
allx spcakiiuf tlic )iiorc securely (/rounded a conditloued response is.
the eloser related it is to some original prepotent tendency, and in
nuuiy cases the relation is so close that it is oidy quibblinn to say
that o)ie is an origijial pattern and the other acquired. It seems that
one carries with it the other. Herein lies the fundamental i^roh'em
as to the number of inherited tendencies and instincts. It cannot
be solved with our i)resent state of knowledge. Jealousy, says be-
haviorism, is not inherent or instinctive, but is a result of human
societw l')Ut would not an_\- peoples, given the prepotent tendencies
our behaviorists grant, develop jealous}? Are we not then ([uib-
bling as to whether it is a part of our native equipment?
Again, if human individuals everywhere develop a response
called lauyhter and some degree of wit and humor, wh_\- not say
that human individuals are so constituted that when adecjuately
stimulated they show a tendency to such behavior, and save the
stretch of our imagination in trying to show ther habitual origin
from the sensitive zone? There is only one sound reason wh\- they
do not : these activities suggest purposive behavior.
A I. Finally, we owe much to the behaviorists for their diligent
and purposive research work on learning by trial and error. Yerkes'
and Koehler's researches do not substantiate the extreme faith of
the behaviorists in trial and error. Koehler says, 'T know that
several psychologists will not easily believe that my description of
intellectual behavior in apes is correct."
Even within their own ranks come man}- dissenting votes. T^-o-
fessor Tolman in the Psychological Reviezv for Jul\', 1925, shows
that goal-seeking is an essential part of animal behavior. He says
that prepotent tendencies are to be recognized by the teleological
patterns of the final goals which they achieve.
All psychology attempts to explain behavior, while behaviorism
is a study of mechanistic physiology. In this sense the behaviorist
ma\' apply a quantitative scientific method, but he can never ex-
plain behavior or evaluate conduct. On the other hand, I do not
believe that it is possible for those of us who admit mental activit\'.
consciousness, and purpose as causes of conduct to be scientifica!l\-
accurate in the sense of the physical sciences.
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l)v behavioristic methods we may measure physical behavior,
but I for one do not believe we shall ever explain or understand
human behavior without a consideration of the fundamental human
impulses, motives, desires, needs, wants, and life-interests. The
explanation of momentarily controlled behavior is one thing, and
that of permanent life-interests quite another. Human life has its
roots in life-impulses, cravings, and some kind of tmiversal tenden-
cies, while the environment is only secondary and a modifying
force.
What a fruitless argument we have had about introspective
psychology plunging us into mysticism. Did an}' one ever stop to
contemplate the mystery of the synoptic theory? Can you think
of a greater mystery than to place all that has ever been done and
attributed to mind in the neurones ! How misleading is the catcJi-
word neural pattern! Try to conceive what these neural patterns
laid away in the brain are ! Neural patterns have been even more
misleading than the old idea of sensation as being produced by
images transmitted from the outside object. One's imagination
might stake off in the cortex a neural pattern for a mountain, but
how shall one imagine a persistent neural pattern to write a Faust,
to conquer the world, to be a Lincoln or a great world leader? Are
these patterns localized in definite parts of the cortex? Does con-
sciousness involve the whole of the cortex or only parts of it, or
does it shift? Brain surgery and experiments on animals bids fair
to revolutionize the whole neuro-synaptic theory.
I cannot help but conceive consciousness as the most complex-
form of energy known to man and one that is so stabilized as to be
in turn one of the causes of human conduct. Even if consciousness
is the direct result of cortical action, is it not in keeping with the
order of nature that consciousness also may become a cause of
activit}' in human beings ?
In conclusion, it seems evident that the gap that separates be-
haviorism—or mechanistic physiology—from other forms of general
psychology is the question of considering any form of mind as a
cause, and the attacks of behaviorism on general psychology have
as a matter of fact been directed mainly against the points I have
mentioned because these manifestations imply purpose or some vi-
talistic force not reducable to electrons and protons as conceived
by a mechanistic philosophy. Hence introspection is to be aban-
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doned as absolutely unscientific and purpose is to be abhorred as
leading only to mysticism. All forms of life are to be cast in
quantitative measurable terms. All qualitative forms of existence
and behavior must be relegated to speculative philosophy.
However, in spite of behaviorism, the value of everything and
of life itself will continue to be determined by human desires, feel-
ings, purposes, and strivings. Xot only psychologists, but all men
will continue to introspect their desires, feelings, ambitions, and
destinies. The behaviorists, without knowing it, are on the road
to the most incomprehensible mystery the mind of man has ever
conceived
—
ihc transfer of all human achievements and ciznlization
to the neurones and synaptic connections. Yes, even the neurones
trying to explain themselves through the behaviorists. Most of us
are only advocating and pleading for the legitimate use of any and
all methods that will help us to better understand human behavior.
That, we think, involves a proper consideration of our native equip-
ment by heredit}', the whole physical being, the whole outer con-
ditions, stimulus-response, and all that it is possible to ascertain
by legitimate and well-guided introspection. ]\Ian does not exist
for science, but science exists to give z'ahte to Jiuuian life.
